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Abstract The 187 countries that adopted the Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 at the
March 2015 UN World Conference on Disaster Risk
Reduction included most African countries. Many devel-
oping regions of the world, particularly in Asia and Latin
America, made considerable progress in implementing the
previous Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015. But,
despite the fact that Africa is one of the regions most
vulnerable and least resilient to disasters, which continue to
be exacerbated by poverty, climate change, rapid urban-
ization, and structural transformation, it saw only slow
progress. This article considers the challenges Africa faces
in implementing the Sendai Framework and recommends
that besides ‘‘Africanizing’’ Sendai goals and strengthening
the region’s political commitment to disaster risk reduction
(DRR), Africa should also develop a single framework that
integrates DRR, sustainable development, climate change
adaptation, and conflict prevention. Equally important is
the need for a strong recognition that disasters are created
endogenously as well as exogenously, and thus require
local solutions and local investment.
Keywords Sub-Saharan Africa  Climate change
adaptation  Disaster risk reduction  Resilience  Sendai
framework  Sustainable development
1 Introduction
Building resilient communities continues to be the watch-
word of disaster risk reduction (DRR). The Sendai
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030
(SFDRR), adopted by 187 countries in Sendai, Japan, has
reinforced the commitment to building disaster resilience.
According to the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction (UNISDR 2015a, p. 3), many disasters are
exacerbated by climate change, are increasing in frequency
and intensity, and ‘‘significantly impede progress towards
sustainable development.’’ If the Sendai Framework
achieves its goals, by 2030 a much lower risk of disaster
will result in fewer lives lost, more livelihoods safe-
guarded, and healthier communities (UNISDR 2015a). The
implementation of the SFDRR will be at four levels: glo-
bal, national, regional, and local.
This article discusses the implications of the Sendai
Framework for Sub-Saharan Africa, based on a literature
review and a wide-ranging evaluation of research on DRR
in the region. The article first addresses the concept of
resilience and examines how the concept is utilized in
policy and practice, which may have critical implications
for the implementation of the SFDRR. It then discusses the
SFDRR’s background, highlighting its origins and the
challenges of translating it into action. Subsequent sections
introduce the hazard, vulnerability, and resilience issues
peculiar to Africa and reflect on the integration within DRR
of climate change adaptation (CCA), sustainable develop-
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recommendations on the implementation of the SFDRR in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
2 Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction
Why, over recent years, has resilience become the key
concept in DRR, sustainable development, and climate
change adaptation? Resilience is not only a ‘‘seductive’’
concept (Welsh 2014) but also an attractive one norma-
tively, intellectually, and practically. It offers a mechanism
for conceptualizing—and deepening and widening our
understanding of—the means by which open and complex
systems respond to dynamic and unpredictable external
variables and, potentially, produce positive outcomes
(Manyena and Gordon 2015). Although the definition of
resilience has been widely contested, a consensus seems to
be emerging, focused on the capacity of an individual,
community, country, region, or system to cope positively
with rapid-onset shocks or significant and protracted
sources of stress arising from natural and anthropogenic
hazards (Manyena 2006; Alexander 2013; Matyas and
Pelling 2015). This trend is associated with the proactive
approach of harnessing the strengths of communities, as
distinct from the traditional reactive, top-down approaches
to DRR associated with the deficit model of vulnerability,
where disaster victims are seen as ‘‘helpless’’ (Manyena
2009, p. 9).
But not all resilience issues have been solved and some
seemingly-resolved issues remain unresolved Table 1),
particularly those involving a Western framing of the dis-
course. Despite the post-structural focus on both the con-
text and the local, the terms ‘‘disaster,’’ ‘‘risk,’’ ‘‘hazard,’’
and ‘‘vulnerability,’’ which are fundamental to under-
standing resilience, are in many places unlocal or foreign.
In many languages these terms, and resilience itself, have
no equivalents and two or more of them can be synony-
mous. Risk, for instance, first used in seventeenth century
Europe, is an abstract and endemically contested concept
(Adelswa¨rd and Sachs 1998; Wynne 2002; Schehr 2005;
Chan 2009), which has become an instrument for discur-
sively framing public meaning of threats and uncertainty,
mainly legitimized through science, technology, and
innovation (Wynne 2002). Yet, in DRR it is used generi-
cally, implicitly assuming that stakeholders both global and
local have a shared meaning of the term. They are similarly
assumed to have a shared meaning of disaster, hazard,
vulnerability, and resilience. Clearly, a systematic com-
parison of local and global disaster discourses might both
broaden and challenge the epistemological assumptions
underpinning disaster research and scholarship.
One crucial unresolved issue identified by Matyas and
Pelling (2015) is whether resilience should go beyond the
normative notion to include politics, power, and culture.
This does not refer to the UK government’s Community
Resilience Programme, which essentially aims to produce
community and to govern its behavior by forming identities
and relationships that can be more efficiently managed and
directed. The UK government’s handing over of responsi-
bility to local volunteers and organizations is less about
empowerment than about shifting responsibility from the
state to vulnerable communities, who are thus more easily
governed (Bulley 2013). This notion of resilience is
instrumentalist, an example of Foucault’s governmentality
(Joseph 2013): the (re)production of responsibilized citi-
zens, who can take care of themselves and also become, or
continue to be, unquestioning subjects.
Most definitions of resilience tend to relate to adaptive
capacity. Many will agree that this implies making changes
to live with a disturbance or which may be thought of as
‘‘making friends with the disaster.’’ But these changes are
made within the context of a status quo that could have
caused disaster in the first place. Because many disasters
are sociopolitical constructions, it is not enough to focus
solely on adaptive capacity: transformative capacity is also
critical. When the system’s ecological, social, or economic
conditions become untenable or intolerable, new ones must
be created (Nelson et al. 2007). This might include
addressing the structural causes of a disaster to be found in
social fragility, civil conflict, the breakdown of social
contracts, corruption, poor governance, and human rights
abuses (Manyena and Gordon 2015).
That disasters cause conflict and conflict exacerbates
vulnerability to disasters has been recognized in the liter-
ature. Political instability and conflict are recognized as
being among the underlying causes of disasters, with
‘‘war’’ being one of the ‘‘dynamic pressure[s]’’ on the
progression of vulnerability (Wisner et al. 2004, p. 74). In
their reflection on the increase in the numbers of disasters
over the past 20 years, Cavallo and Noy (2010) argue that
if the trend continues, it is likely to jeopardize the stability
of developing areas with limited capacities to either finance
or organize disaster prevention policies. Similarly, in their
study on the effect of armed conflict on vulnerability to
natural hazards, Marktanner et al. (2015) found that dis-
aster deaths in conflict zones are on average 40 % higher
than in zones not currently suffering from armed conflict.
Conversely, Nel and Righarts (2008) demonstrate how civil
conflicts significantly increased the risk of violent conflict
in developing countries, and recommend that more atten-
tion be given to understanding the structural risks posed by
cataclysmic events.
If rising disaster trend continues, it is not only likely to
destabilize the capacity of countries and communities in
DRR activities. It is almost guaranteed to reduce hard-won
development gains. It is for these reasons that resilience
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has gained currency in sustainable development, climate
change, and humanitarian action. Donors and international
organizations, including the European Commission, United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
UK’s Department for International Development (DFID),
UN agencies, international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and the World Bank have progressively embed-
ded resilience in their policies and programs (Matyas and
Pelling 2015).
The integration of the disaster narrative with that of
development is not new: since the 1970s, disasters have
been recognized as indicators of unsolved development
problems or failed development, which increase people’s
vulnerability to natural hazards, including climate-related
hazards (O’Keefe et al. 1976; Cuny 1983). Similarly,
flawed development processes can increase vulnerability to
disasters through the creation and exposure of communities
to new risks generated by investment decisions both public
and private (O’Keefe et al. 1976; Cuny 1983). Emerging
from this narrative is a related argument about integrating
DRR and CCA, whose commonalities—both deal with risk
reduction resulting from hazards, exposure, and vulnera-
bility—have been recognized by many publications and
conferences (Schipper and Pelling 2006; Conway et al.
2011; Kelman 2015). The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) (2014), however, while clearly
recognizing the relationship between DRR and CCA, tends
to view DRR actions as complementary or add-on, rather
than as integral, along with CCA, in an overarching
framework.
Investment in resilience-building is critically important
at both the international and local levels. Putting resources
into DRR produces a ‘‘triple dividend of resilience’’
according to the Overseas Development Institute1 and the
World Bank2 (Tanner et al. 2015, p. 15), particularly if
there are strong interlinkages between the finance mecha-
nisms of DRR, sustainable development, and climate
change adaptation (Fig. 1). But the shift of international
policy from ‘‘common but differentiated responsibility’’
(CBDR) to ‘‘mutually agreed terms’’ (MAT) casts doubt on
the ‘‘polluter pays’’ principle of placing more responsibility
on developed countries to transfer resources to developing
countries. This means developing regions, Africa included,
have to mobilize local resources to invest in DRR.
The current drive for resilience is laudable, but, if it
translates to an abnegation of political responsibility and
the failure to share power and resources (O’Brien and
O’Keefe 2013), it may be a recipe for even greater vul-
nerability and poverty. If governments want their citizens
to be resilient, they must give them the means and the tools
for ‘‘doing’’ resilience. But even if governments do provide
the necessary tools and means, a major challenge might
remain: the ‘‘fitness for purpose’’ of the conceptual models
and frameworks by which, it is hoped, resilience will be
operationalized or put into practice. Interestingly, several
models and frameworks have been suggested for opera-
tionalizing resilience. These include Cutter et al.’s (2008)
Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP) model, Twigg’s
(2007) Characteristics of Disaster Resilient Communities,
Norris et al.’s (2008) Networked Adaptive Capacity model,
and Birkmann et al.’s (2013) MOVE (Methods for the
Improvement of Vulnerability Assessment in Europe)
model (Table 2). Although each of these frameworks has
limitations, between them they capture most of the ele-
ments contained in the various definitions of resilience: risk
drivers (hazard, vulnerability, and exposure), resilience
building processes, and outcomes.
Twigg’s (2007) Characteristics of Disaster Resilient
Communities framework is informed by the five priority
actions of the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015
(governance, risk assessment, knowledge and education,
risk management and vulnerability reduction, and disaster
preparedness and response), which enables a holistic
Table 1 Resolved and unresolved resilience issues
Resolved issues Unresolved issues
Vulnerability and resilience are not simply opposites: there is some
overlap between them
(1) Whether resilience is a spontaneous or a deliberate process; (2) the
complexity or otherwise of the interactions that cause it; (3) whether or
not it can be fostered and developed
There has been a gradual shift from an outcome-oriented notion of
resilience towards a more process-oriented one
(1) Whether resilience is a normative concept and (2) the extent to which
it is implicated in the role of power, politics, and cultural values in
limiting adaptive and transformative capacities
Resilience is more than just bounce-back; it is not possible to bounce
back to the same position before the disaster as individuals and
organizations within structures have changed
Whether resilience as a term should be used to refer to individual
components of a system and or to general characteristics of a system
itself
Source Matyas and Pelling (2015)
1 http://www.odi.org.
2 http://www.worldbank.org.
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overview of resilient communities. Not only does Twigg’s
framework appear to be weak on the theory that underpins
it, but the large number of indicators (167 for character-
istics of a disaster-resilient community and 157 for
enabling environments) make it difficult to plan for their
application on the ground. In Norris et al.’s (2008) Net-
worked Adaptive Capacity model resilience rests on the
4Rs (rapidity, redundancy, resistance, resourcefulness) that
are supported by adaptive capacities comprising four pri-
mary sets: economic development, social capital,
information and communication, and community compe-
tence. There are two problems, however. Not only does the
omission of the link between risk drivers—hazard, vul-
nerability, and exposure—make the model less holistic and
therefore less help in understanding resilience, but paying
increased attention towards the 4Rs in dealing with ‘‘stress
and crisis’’ (Norris et al. 2008, p. 144) suggests the model
is in the response mode.
Some of these weaknesses, though, are addressed by
Cutter et al.’s (2008) Disaster Resilience of Place (DROP)
Fig. 1 The triple dividend of
resilience. Source Adapted from
Overseas Development Institute
and the World Bank (Tanner
et al. 2015, p. 15)
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No details on capacities; unclear
about transformation
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Source The author
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model. Presenting resilience as both an inherent, or ante-
cedent, condition and a process of disaster is not new. Nor
is the argument that the impact of disasters can be reduced
by pre-disaster mitigation and by building capacity for
preparedness, coping, and absorption. What might be new
is that the rate of recovery becomes a key measure of
resilience, determined by the extent to which the absorptive
capacity threshold is exceeded by the disaster’s impact.
However, the silence of the DROP model on transforma-
tive capacity limits the utility of the framework for dis-
cussions of how to dismantle the status quo that could have
caused the disaster in the first place. Birkmann et al.’s
(2013) MOVE framework, grounded in vulnerability and
resilience thinking, attempts to address most of the weak-
nesses identified in most of the frameworks. Underpinned
by political economy, social ecology, development studies,
DRR, and climate change systems science, the framework
is a hybrid. Some of the strengths of the MOVE framework
are that it is nonlinear, place-specific, and straddles mul-
tiple approaches and epistemologies between natural and
social sciences and DRR, thus promoting communication
across different communities. But like the DROP model,
the framework is silent on transformative capacity, a sur-
prising lacuna as the framework draws from critical theory
that has a strong focus on social change.
3 The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR)
The Sendai Framework is the culmination of international
efforts that can be traced to the 1990–2000 International
Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). Although
the IDNDR (Schipper and Pelling 2006) looked at disasters
conventionally regarded as ‘‘natural’’—as acts of God or
acts of Nature—there was already compelling evidence
that disasters were neither (Wijkman and Timberlake
1984). Disasters were increasingly being described as
socially constructed, thus rejecting environmental deter-
minism as the sole element in their causation (O’Keefe
et al. 1976; Cuny 1983; Wisner et al. 2004). Similarly,
while the mid-term review of IDNDR, held in Yokahama
in 1994, recognized the link between disaster and devel-
opment, it still assumed that disasters were ‘‘natural’’
(Schipper and Pelling 2006, p. 32). This was changed
10 years later, however, by the adoption of the Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005–2015 (HFA) by 168 UN
member states in Kobe, Japan. The fact that the HFA was
agreed upon in the wake of the 2014 Indian Ocean Tsunami
helped to push the negotiations onto higher levels,
including disaster causation and social construction (Wis-
ner and Walker 2005). The HFA’s expected outcome was
stated to be ‘‘the substantial reduction of disaster losses, in
lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets
of communities and countries’’ (UNISDR 2005, p. 3).
But the actual outcome of the HFA contained contradic-
tions: while disaster mortality decreased over its period, not
only did exposure increase faster than vulnerability
decreased but also the economic costs continued to rise
(Lavell and Maskrey 2014). This suggests that the resources
meant for poverty reduction, for example, continued to be
diverted to cover the economic losses. This outcome was not
surprising, since the HFA ‘‘gave only lip service’’ (Wisner
and Walker 2005, p. 90) to some of the fundamental issues
visible in 2005. Many of these absent issues—including
measurable indicators, clear financing mechanisms, the role
of conflict in natural disasters, the superficiality of DRR, the
links between climate change adaptation and sustainable
development, and the fragmentation and ‘‘siloization’’ of
sectors resulting in for example, inefficiencies in leveraging
resources and data consistencies—needed to be discussed at
the UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction
(WCDRR) in Sendai.
The SFDRR’s intended outcome was the ‘‘substantial
reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods
and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural
and environmental assets of persons, businesses, commu-
nities and countries’’ (UNISDR 2015a, p. 6). This outcome
will be measured against seven targets, achieved through
four priority actions: (1) understanding disaster risk; (2)
strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster
risk; (3) investing in DRR for resilience; and (4) enhancing
disaster preparedness for effective response and to facili-
tate ‘‘Build Back Better’’ in recovery, rehabilitation, and
reconstruction (UNISDR 2015a). Although the outcome
and priorities for action are not fundamentally different
from those of the HFA, the catch-all, densely worded
document not only imports the discourses of other disci-
plines but also incorporates the old and the new discursive
framings including a range of phrases—such as ‘‘small-
scale disasters,’’ ‘‘people-centered’’ DRR, ‘‘business resi-
lience,’’ ‘‘Build Back Better,’’ and ‘‘all-of-society.’’
Critically, it was recognized that while 2015 was
marked by three landmark agreements—the third UN
World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in March,
the Sustainable Development Goals conference in
September, and the Climate Change conference in
December—efforts to ensure these international agree-
ments are coherent and mutually reinforcing would con-
tribute to multiple benefits at the national and local levels
(UNISDR 2014a). It was stated that:
Climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction
integration form the building blocks for current and
future risk prevention, leading to resilience […] this
integration needs to be introduced into the delivery of
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basic social services including education, health and
water (among others). (UNISDR 2014a, p. 4)
Indeed, the arguments around the inclusion of sustainable
development as an overarching framework in which DRR and
CCA are subsets have become louder and clearer (Lavell and
Maskrey 2014). While the SFDRR endorses the connections
between DRR and sustainable development by stating that
‘‘disaster risk reduction is essential to achieve sustainable
development’’ (UNISDR 2015a, p. 8), fragmentation con-
tinues. From the outset, the 2005 World Conference on
Disaster Reduction, where the HFA was adopted, ‘‘gave only
lip service’’ to the link between the millennium development
goals (MDGs) and DRR and the outcomes generally
emphasized hardware and top down rather software and
bottom up approaches (Wisner and Walker 2005, p. 90).
Similarly, DRR, sustainable development, and climate
change adaptation continue to be separate under the SFDRR.
This contrasts with UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon’s
opening address in which he said, ‘‘sustainability starts in
Sendai.’’ A footnote on page 6 of the SFDRR states.
The climate change issues mentioned in the present
[SFDRR] framework remain within the mandate of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
under the competences of the Parties to the Convention.
(UNISDR 2015a, p. 5).
While climate change is mentioned in the SFDRR, the
mandate to address climate change remains with the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC) and not with UNISDR, which, though not ideal
for our purposes, is understandable in the context of the
enormous political sensitivity of any UN statements on
climate change. Similarly, sustainable development is also
mentioned, but its operationalization remains with the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
The arguments at the third UN WCDRR in support of
recognizing conflict as one of the major underlying causes of
disasters was loud, noisy, and clear. The erosion of institu-
tions, population displacement, and the loss of livelihoods in
ongoing conflicts in Somalia, South Sudan, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Niger, and Mali, for example,
all exacerbated the disasters that did occur. Interestingly, the
2015 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction
(UNISDR 2015b) provides convincing empirical evidence
of the role of conflict in the disaster equation.
4 The Hazard, Vulnerability, and Resilience
Context of Africa
In the statement from the Fifth Africa Regional Platform
and Third Ministerial Meeting for Disaster Risk Reduction
that summarizes Africa’s contributions to the post-2015
framework for DRR (UNISDR 2014a), the term
‘‘resilience’’ is repeated 15 times, which may suggest that
building resilience to disasters is high on the African
agenda. Over the past decade there have been attempts in
Africa to enhance the resilience of communities to disas-
ters, particularly after the adoption of the Hyogo Frame-
work in 2005. The backdrop to this statement was the
widely accepted understanding that disaster risk is a
function of the combination of four factors. These are: (1)
the hazard—the probability of a hazard event; (2) the
exposure—the size of the population and the value of the
assets subject to the hazard event; (3) vulnerability—the
susceptibility of populations to the hazard event; and (4)
resilience—the capacity of communities, or lack of it, to
deal with the hazard event (Wisner et al. 2004; Koks et al.
2015). Despite this understanding it remains unclear how
these variables interact in creating the conditions for a
disaster. But it is understood that urbanization, environ-
mental degradation, climate change, mismanagement of
natural resources, conflicts, state failure, and ‘‘bad’’ gov-
ernance are universally recognized as important drivers of
increased disaster vulnerability (Frerks 2010).
For Africa, a region with great potential for economic
growth in which GDP is projected to increase from about
USD 3 trillion in 2010 to about USD 20 trillion in 2040
(UNECA 2015, p. 5), the SFDRR provides an opportunity
not only to address chronic and potential disaster risks, but
also to protect development gains. Between 1990 and 2012,
Africa experienced an average of 152 disasters per year,
the majority of which were triggered by hydrological and
climatological hazards (UNISDR 2014b). In 2014, 114
disasters affected over 6.8 million Africans, with approxi-
mately USD 6.4 billion in economic losses (CRED 2015).
Although the CRED statistics are questionable in that they
exclude small-scale disasters, which might well add up to a
large proportion of the total, they do help us to understand
the scale of the threats posed to lives and livelihoods, and
thus the importance of the implementation of the SFDRR.
The Fifth Africa Regional Platform and Third Ministerial
Meeting for Disaster Risk Reduction (the African DRR
Platform), in Abuja, Nigeria in May 2014 (UNISDR
2014a), generated several recommendations for the third
UN WCDRR in Sendai, with an emphasis on building
disaster resilience.
Africa’s hydrological and climatological hazards are
mainly associated with shifting patterns in weather and
climate, with climate variability being the key challenge.
The combination of dryness and extreme rainfall means
rainfed agriculture will become an increasingly risky ven-
ture, and drought-related food insecurity is likely to be a
common, if episodic, feature of life in the future. At the
Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s
annual Post-Season Review Workshop 2014/15 on DRR in
Johannesburg in May 2015, reports were presented on
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drought impacts attributed to the combined negative
impacts of climate change, poor external aid practices,
and—particularly in Zimbabwe and the Democratic
Republic of Congo—poor governance. There were strong
early indications of food supply shortages, especially
maize, in 2015/16. South Africa, which accounts for 40 %
of regional maize output, expected a 33 % decline in 2015.
Malawi and Mozambique expected a decline as a result of a
combination of flooding and dry spells, while Madagas-
car’s rice production was expected to decline due to pro-
longed waterlogging. Similarly, Zimbabwe experienced
widespread crop failure and the loss of about 23 % of its
cultivated land due to dry spells. As a result, the subre-
gional maize import requirements were forecast to increase
significantly to about 1.76 million tons in 2015/16. In
Zimbabwe, maize imports were expected to nearly double,
which prompted the Zimbabwean government to lift the
2014 food import ban in anticipation of a tight domestic
supply (SADC 2015).
Population displacement and migration, particularly
from rural to urban areas are likely to place a strain on
urban infrastructure. Intraregional migration has also
increased the likelihood of the spread of cholera from
countries where it is endemic, such as Malawi, Mozam-
bique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Moreover, flood emergen-
cies have become increasingly transboundary: although
this study could not obtain comparable data, of the 26
recorded flood emergencies between 2000 and 2012 14
were transboundary (SADC 2015).
Knowledge and understanding of disaster risk is the first
priority of the SFDRR, so baseline information from which
to benchmark resilience-building efforts and clear targets
are vital. The Sendai Framework goals to substantially
reduce mortality, the number of affected people, the extent
of disaster damage, and so on is likely to lead to confusion
and so needs clarification of objectives and monitoring
procedures.
The fact that the SFDRR is based on Western framings
of the web of meanings around the term ‘‘disaster’’ raises
the question: are these Western narratives consistent with
the conceptual frameworks of African counterparts. Not
only is the concept of risk slippery and sloppy at the best of
times (Wynne 2002; Schehr 2005; Chan 2009), but a cru-
cial debate also is missing. This gap is centered on the fact
that in many African expressions, and indeed in many
world languages and cultures, the term ‘‘risk’’ does not
exist. The notion of risk tends to be commonly associated
with terms such as ‘‘danger’’ or ingozi in Zulu, njodzi in
Shona, or ja`mba´ in Yoruba. Incorporating indigenous
concepts of risk is likely to give a renewed impetus and
meaning to the way it is viewed in Africa. Currently, risk
has colonial connotations as it tends to be rehearsed in
English, in French as risque, and in Portuguese as risco. Is
it time to go back to the drawing board to discursively
Africanize risk? There are several examples that demon-
strate the benefits of expressing concepts in local language.
Gari (2006) demonstrates how, in the late 1960s, Omar
Draz, a Syrian Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)
advisor, was able to combine rangeland development,
conservation, and management by building upon small-
scale protected zones (hema or hima in Arabic) as the
conceptual basis for a successful grazing cooperative sys-
tem in Syria. The results were remarkable: the episodic
disastrous impact of drought on livestock numbers and
offtake was drastically reduced. The system was all based
on convincing the Bedouin that all one was talking about
was reverting to a traditional concept led by chieftains and
ara¯fah (dispute settlers) of the tribes in order to protect and
preserve tribal rights and land capability to make it work.
This is analogous to the argument about language here,
which may point to the practical ways in which the SFDRR
could be applied successfully to an African context. This
includes working with social structures such as a council of
elders and traditional healers who tend to observe and
express the behaviors of plants, domestic and wild animals,
birds, insects, atmospheric and astronomic phenomena, and
wind in their local languages to warn of an impending
disaster (Kaya and Koitsiwe 2016). While studies on the
integration of science and indigenous knowledge systems
in Africa continues to grow (see for example, Chang’a
et al. 2010; Egeru 2012; Mavhura et al. 2013; Masinde
2015), there is still a gap in incorporating indigenous
knowledge systems, including language expressions in
Africa’s disaster policies. The first point of call would be to
learn more about African linguistic concepts and analogs
for danger/disaster, as well as to integrate fundamental
indigenous knowledge systems into DRR frameworks.
5 Integration of Disaster Risk Reduction, Climate
Change Adaptation, and Sustainable
Development in Africa
There are plenty of examples in Africa where a combina-
tion of development and climate impacts have generated
disasters. Between 1956 and 1958, approximately 57,000
Tonga people were forcibly moved by the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland to arid areas far away from both
sides of the Zambezi River to pave the way for the con-
struction of Kariba Dam (Colson 1971). On the Zimbab-
wean side of the Zambezi River, for example, poverty has
notoriously become the badge of the Tonga. Manyena
(2013, p. 25) notes the common descriptions of the Tonga
by the Zimbabwean media such as ‘‘marginalised,’’ ‘‘iso-
lated,’’ ‘‘poor,’’ ‘‘backward,’’ ‘‘minority,’’ ‘‘primitive,’’
‘‘dangerous,’’ ‘‘degraded,’’ and ‘‘two-toed people.’’
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Conyers and Cumanzala (2004) attribute the poverty of
Zambezi valley Tonga to the consequences of Kariba Dam
resettlement of 1950s which are still felt today, mainly due
to development neglect by the post-colonial government.
They point to the loss of entitlements to floodplain culti-
vation, fishing, hunting but also limited access to com-
mercial fishing and tourism industries developed along the
Kariba lakeshore. Lessing (1993, p. 381) encourages peo-
ple to visit Kariba Dam, ‘‘for there is nothing like it any-
where else in the world,’’ but warns the travellers ‘‘not to
visit the river Tonga, for they will break your heart.’’ The
involuntary displacement narrative has been reinforced by
the minority status of the Tonga and associated lack of
political power. Manyena (2013) attributes the persistence
of poverty to lack of political influence as well as the
geopolitical construction of the Zambezi valley, which
makes Zambezi valley population vulnerable to multiple
disasters that are manifest in the form of food insecurity,
frequent waterborne diseases outbreaks, and increased
mortality and morbidity rates resulting from HIV and
AIDS. In addition to suffering massive property and
livelihoods losses, the Tonga people have benefited hardly
at all from the dam and, resettled in arid areas, they now
depend on humanitarian assistance every year, turning
them into development refugees (Weist 1995). The major
concern of the project was return to investment, based on
conventional economic metrics such as cost-benefit anal-
ysis, rather than the associated risks that the project would
generate (WCD 2000). Meanwhile climate data indicates a
Zambezi River Valley warming of 5 C and a decreased
precipitation of 190 mm per century meaning that the
valley will be an agricultural high-risk area by the middle
of this century, further threatening the already poverty-
stricken and food insecure Tonga population (Magadza
2010). At the same time, low reservoir levels, and a dete-
riorating dam wall ‘‘facing an increased risk of collapse’’
(Pan et al. 2013, p. 246) that increases the risk of floods all
the way downstream into Mozambique and Malawi, bring
to the shore the importance of transboundary disaster risk
management. The Kariba Dam helps us to see how con-
ceptualizing disasters as development problems shifts
attention from viewing risk as only exogenously created
towards viewing risk as both exogenously and endoge-
nously generated by development processes.
But integrating DRR, climate change, and sustainable
development under the SFDRR also requires the African
Union Commission to change its DRR culture. The
implementation of the SFDRR in Africa is subject to the
Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU 2000), which
provides the constitutional basis for all policies, strategies,
and programs and all actions of the African Union.
Although Article 13(1e) of the Constitutive Act (2000,
p. 11) simply cites ‘‘environmental protection,
humanitarian action and disaster response and relief,’’ it
has been (mis)interpreted to include DRR. Interestingly,
Article 13(1e) provided the basis for the African Regional
Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction and the Extended
Programme for the Implementation of the African Regional
Strategy, the African Union Humanitarian Policy and the
Policy on Disaster Management, the Africa Policy on Post-
Conflict Reconstruction, and related mechanism and
structures.
The African Regional Strategy for Disaster Risk
Reduction (the Strategy), which is of interest to this article,
emerged from the recognition that disaster impacts were an
impediment to sustainable development in Africa. In
response to this realization, DRR was integrated into all
phases of the development and implementation of the
Strategy. The objectives of the Strategy were aligned with
the HFA’s priorities and included increased political
commitment to DRR, improved identification and assess-
ment of disaster risks, improved knowledge management
for DRR, increased public awareness of DRR, improved
governance of DRR institutions, and the integration of
DRR with emergency response management. The imple-
mentation of the Strategy lies with the African Union
Commission, and the Africa Working Group on Disaster
Risk Reduction (AWG) is the secretariat. The AWG draws
members from the African Union Commission, the Secre-
tariat of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD), all Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in
Africa and key partners such as the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank Global
Fund for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, the African
Development Bank, the United Nations International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR), and the Inter-
national Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, as well as representative of higher education
institutions and civil society. Having recognized that the
African DRR Strategy and Plan of Action were not coor-
dinated with the HFA, the Extended Programme of Action
for the Africa Regional Strategy for DRR (2006–2015)
(AU and UNISDR 2010) was developed, which incorpo-
rated climate change adaptation, DRR, and sustainable
development.
The main challenge to implementing these African DRR
strategies was the limits to the African Union’s institutional
capacity. Because the African Union did not have a disaster
coordination unit during the operating period of the HFA,
the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture was
given the responsibility of implementing the Strategy and
coordinating it with the AWG. Since the Department of
Rural Economy and Agriculture also had limited capacity,
it depended on UNISDR for technical support. In this way,
UNISDR became the de facto coordinator of the AWG.
Although, like the SFDRR, the HFA placed primary
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responsibility for the implementation of its strategy on
regional bodies and national governments to lead the DRR
processes, including the integration of DRR, sustainable
development, and climate change adaptation into a single
framework (Schipper and Pelling 2006; Kelman 2015), this
does not appear to have happened in Africa. Despite
placing both DRR and climate change adaptation under the
Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture, creating
synergies might still pose a challenge because these
departments have separate mandates from the UN system.
For Africa to effectively implement the SFDRR, it needs to
go beyond revising the African DRR Strategy and estab-
lishing an institutional framework and begin to build its
own technical capacity using its own resources. These fault
lines do not end with the SFDRR: they are even stronger,
wider, and deeper at regional and national levels. To build
synergies between DRR, CCA, and sustainable develop-
ment, it might need to start with reforming the UN systems
by dismantling the rigid UN mandates that should be scaled
down to regional and national levels.
Similarly, the five subregional economic communities
(RECs) and national governments will need to reform
their institutions to integrate DRR, CCA, and sustainable
development into a single framework. A study by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA) on DRR mainstreaming in Africa found that 21
of the 54 countries had disaster reduction policies and 51
out of 54 had a unit, department, or ministry responsible
for DRR (UNECA 2015). But the study further found that
while the development of DRR policies suggests the
existence of the political will to implement DRR, placing
DRR in the Civil Protection Department, Ministry of
Home Affairs or Interior, or under the President or Prime
Minister’s Office is reminiscent of a military approach to
disaster management, and makes DRR a security rather
than a development issue. The military approach adopts a
command and control leadership style, rooted in the
military model of emergency preparedness and response.
The assumption of the command and control model
should be understood, according to Dynes (1994), in
terms of the 3Cs. The first ‘‘C’’ assumes that disasters are
characterized by ‘‘chaos’’ and the other two ‘‘Cs’’ suggest
the chaos can be eliminated by command and control. The
command and control formulation, although has a longer
history, draws heavily on World War II and Cold War
attitudes. It recognizes the capacity of military organiza-
tions—deeply embedded in disaster management and civil
protection organizations—to deal with disasters consid-
ering the military is a disciplined force, and has the
equipment and stockpile of resources to respond (Dynes
1994). Most of the legal frameworks, consequently, tend
to be skewed more towards an emergency preparedness
and response mode than one oriented towards sustainable
development.
Despite these concerns, Kishore (2011) found, as part of
the Mid-Term Review of the HFA, that new DRR legis-
lations, policies, and action plans were rarely harmonized
or synchronized with preexisting frameworks in other
directly relevant sectors such as water resources, agricul-
ture, power, and energy. Government sector agencies, often
themselves nearly hermetically self-contained, were rein-
forced by the fragmented UN leadership of the three key
communities (sustainable development, DRR, and climate
change) where UNDP ‘‘owns’’ the SDGs, UNISDR
‘‘owns’’ DRR, while UNFCC ‘‘owns’’ climate change.
While the HFA has been one of the key UN strategies since
2005, some United Nations Development Assistance
Frameworks (UNDAFs) barely mention DRR, although
some agencies have taken measures to include DRR in
their country program development. This means DRR
advocacy was weak, particularly given that UNDAFs are
major instruments for UN advocacy.
There were exceptions from which African countries
could draw some lessons. In Mozambique and Malawi
DRR has been integrated in national development plans
(UNECA 2015). In Ethiopia, the disaster-development
linkage was mostly visible through social protection
schemes in the form of risk retention and transfer schemes,
where relief resources were applied to development pro-
cesses (Andersson et al. 2011). Ethiopia’s Productive
Safety Net Programme (PSNP) is a public works program
through which food-insecure people are employed in
public work for 5 days a month during the January to June
agricultural slack season. The wages from the public works
enables households to smooth consumption, prevent the
depletion of productive assets, and overcome food short-
ages (Andersson et al. 2011). Although the PSNP has been
hailed as a success in enhancing the protection and creation
of communal and household assets, there are some chal-
lenges. The sustainability of PSNP is questionable as it
heavily relies on external resources (for example, from the
European Commission, USAID, the UK DFID, World
Bank, and the Netherlands). This is compounded by the
lack of clear social protection policies, and unclear donor
policies on linking relief, rehabilitation, and development,
which makes such programs unsustainable and likely to
reinforce existing vulnerabilities in the long run.
6 Investing in Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa
The drive to invest in DRR continues to intensify across the
globe. In 2013, the Global Assessment Report (GAR13)
dedicated itself to DRR investment. Regarding Africa,
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GAR13 highlighted the need for investing in DRR. For
example.
In the case of Cape Verde and Senegal, for example,
in their capitals Praia and Dakar, flooding has inten-
sified over the years […] underlying drivers of flood
risks are poor drainage systems related to land-use
and newly built environments, and limited access to
land. The studies point to West Africa’s continuous
problems in expanding urban centres and the need for
urban planning and sufficient public or private
investments in adequate infrastructure. (UNISDR
2013, p. 69)
Drawing on both studies and experiences, the African
DRR Platform recognized the importance of investing in
DRR and emphasized that:
Financial commitment and investment strategies
should be developed and national governments
should allocate adequate resources for scalable and
flexible adaptive basic social services and social
protection systems, […to] ensure funding opportuni-
ties are available to communities for food security
and resilience building. (UNISDR 2014a, p. 6)
Indeed, investing in proactive rather than reactive DRR
measures is one of the major emphases of the SFDRR (see
Priority 3) (UNISDR 2015a). A public informed about
disaster risks and private investments that addresses under-
lying disaster risk, it is assumed, are ‘‘more cost-effective
than primary reliance on post-disaster response and recov-
ery, and contributes to sustainable development’’ (UNISDR
2015a, p. 13). The SFDRR encourages wide-ranging
investment, including in risk transfer and insurance, finan-
cial protection, critical infrastructure such as schools, hos-
pitals, and physical infrastructures (for example, bridges and
roads), people-centered early warning systems, business
continuity, and technology and innovation.
Although the tools for the tracking of DRR investment
are still underdeveloped, self-assessment reports indicate
that the proportion of countries that systematically incor-
porated DRR into national and sector-level public invest-
ment increased from 38 % in 2011–52 % in 2013 (Gordon
2013). The DRR allocations (excluding rehabilitation and
reconstruction) by the Indonesian government has seen
significantly annual increases with a total of USD 6.4 bil-
lion allocated for the period 2006–2012, about 25 times
more than total international commitments to DRR in
Indonesia in the 30 years from 1980 (Gordon 2013).
But a study by UNECA, which reviewed DRR main-
streaming in Southern African countries, reported that
although DRR legislation was often clear on disaster man-
agement funding it was generally skewed towards initial
response, and investment in DRR was left to the discretion
of government sectors (such as agriculture, health, and
education) (UNECA 2014). Similarly, at the Southern
African Development Community (SADC)’s annual Post-
Season Review Workshop 2014/15 on DRR in Johannes-
burg in May 2015, attended by the present author, the most
noticeable progress in funding was towards emergency
response (SADC 2015). All member states had some form
of national contingency relief fund mechanism. In Bots-
wana, for example, local funds were mobilized for relief
materials such as shelter, food, and vaccination (SADC
2015). In response to the 2014/15 drought, Namibia set
aside N$ 300 million (approximately USD 30 million) for
the sinking and rehabilitation of boreholes, pipeline exten-
sion, irrigation of pearl millet, subsidies for maize seed and
fertilizer for commercial farmers (SADC 2015), but there
are apparently no plans for reducing water demand.
Although most African countries are making efforts in
DRR investment, the indigenous financing of DRR is very
weak (Kellet and Caravani 2013), with a heavy reliance on
external aid, especially in the drought-affected countries of
Niger, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Malawi. In Malawi,
of the USD 81million raised in response to the 2014/15
floods, only about USD 1.2 million came from the
Malawian government (SADC 2015). Kellet and Cara-
vani’s (2013) study Financing Disaster Risk Reduction: A
20 Year Story of International Aid, illustrates the
insignificance of DRR financing in African countries with a
high mortality risk index. This trend is repeated at the
global level. Of the USD 3 trillion aid financing during
1991–2010, only 13.5 billion, or 0.4 %, was for risk
reduction measures before disasters strike, compared with
23.3 billion spent on reconstruction and rehabilitation and
69.9 billion spent on response (Kellet and Caravani 2013).
These financial data should be read with caution—indeed,
perhaps none of the figures is especially reliable—as there
are no clear mechanisms for tracking the financing of DRR
and there is limited understanding of national DRR
financing and the interplay between national and interna-
tional sources (Kellet and Caravani 2013). Nonetheless, on
the basis of international (financial) cooperation and tech-
nology transfer, which deadlocked the SFDRR negotia-
tions, with the principle of ‘‘common but differentiated
responsibility’’ toned down to ‘‘mutually agreed terms.’’
This means African countries should increase DRR allo-
cations within their countries and region in order to meet
the DRR challenges.
7 Conflict and Disaster Risk Reduction in Africa
Conflict often worsens disaster situations of people in
conflict zones. Between 2012 and 2013 the drought that
affected at least 13 million people across Ethiopia,
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Somalia, and northern Kenya was exacerbated by armed
conflict (UNISDR 2015b). According to the INFORM
(2015) database, four of the top five countries in terms of
disaster risk exposure and vulnerability were in Africa
(Table 3); all of them were in conflict or post-conflict
situations.
Interestingly, at the 2015 third UN WCDRR, the term
‘‘conflict’’ was excluded from the SFDRR (UNISDR
2015a). Perhaps the assumption here is that DRR is pri-
marily targeted at stable and well-functioning govern-
ments, and elsewhere DRR should not be of concern. But
should DRR wait for the conflict to end, even though we
know that some conflicts, for example in Somalia, have
continued for two and half decades?
Although risk rankings such as those contained in Table 3
may be a subject of debate, they do not diminish the signif-
icance of Africa’s responsibility in exacerbating conflict,
which warrants inclusion in their DRR programs. While the
SFDRR excludes conflict in its conceptualization of disas-
ters, it is incumbent upon African countries, through the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, to decisively include
conflict in its DRR strategic framework. The basis for the
integration of conflict with DRR is provided by the fact that
humanitarian action and disaster management, though
reactive in nature, is one of the mandates of the African
Union’s Peace and Security Department, which also deals
with conflict, although it is separate from the Rural and
Agriculture Department. Furthermore, the Peace and Secu-
rity Protocol of 2002 (AU 2002), which derives from the
Constitutive Act of the African Union, provides for the
Continental Early Warning System for conflict prevention
(AU 2000) and could be integrated with the early warning
systems for DRR, including Famine Early Warning Systems.
The challenge for the African Union is not only the diffi-
culties in the conceptualization of ‘‘integration,’’ which
tends to be used interchangeably with ‘‘mainstreaming,’’ but
also the availability of tools that can support integration.
8 Conclusion
As for most parts of the world, the SFDRR offers an
opportunity for Africa to enhance its resilience to disasters.
Africa should embrace this opportunity. This means the
African Commission should advocate for increased politi-
cal commitment to DRR, including its being explicitly
embedded in political manifestos. On conceptual issues,
African countries need to invest in research to develop an
enhanced understanding on the concepts involved in
‘‘disaster,’’ including also the meanings and constitutive
elements of terminologies such as risk, vulnerability, and
resilience that are consistent with African languages, tra-
ditions, and cultures. The ‘‘Africanization’’ of disaster risk
will not only increase local understandings of the
endogenous and exogenous constitutive elements of dis-
asters; it also has the potential both to inform the global
DRR architecture and to challenge the ontological and
epistemological assumptions that underpin knowledge of
disaster worldwide.
Consistent with disaster research and scholarship, Africa
needs to develop a clear roadmap that integrates DRR,
sustainable development, climate change adaptation, and
conflict such that DRR wherever possible conducts a
continuous conversation directly with health, education,
investment, absolute poverty reduction, social protection,
environmental sustainability, and conflict prevention.
Table 3 Top 10 countries with high risk index values in 2015
Country Hazard exposure Vulnerability Lack of capacity Risk index World rank
Somalia 8.6 8.4 9.6 8.8 1
Central African Republic 7.8 8.1 8.6 8.2 2
Afghanistan 8.7 6.9 8.2 7.9 3
South Sudan 7.0 7.7 8.9 7.8 4
Sudan 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.2 5
Yemen 7.9 5.6 8.2 7.2 6
Iraq 8.2 6.0 7.0 7.0 7
Congo DR 5.4 7.6 8.3 7.0 8
Chad 4.6 7.8 8.9 6.8 9
Myanmar 8.2 5.4 7.0 6.8 10
Note: The indices are measured from 0 to 10 with 0 being the lowest score and 10 the highest score
Source INFORM (2015)
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